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█ Abstract In this paper I will discuss some claims made by Marraffa in his article Mindreading and Intro-
spection. Early studies claimed that mentalization (or Theory of Mind – ToM) should first be observed 
during the preschool years. Subsequent research pointed out that ToM seems to be already present in in-
fants. I will try to argue that the apparent inconsistency between these findings can be reduced by distin-
guishing between implicit and explicit ToM. From an evolutionary perspective the function of the two 
ToM systems seems to be different. The first is a genetically inherited neurocognitive mechanism which 
allows accurate expectations about behavior. The second is a culturally inherited skill, needed to modu-
late more complex social interactions. I will then discuss the relationship between implicit and explicit 
mentalization and introspection. 
KEYWORDS: Theory of Mind; Implicit Mentalization; Explicit Mentalization; Introspection; Cultural 
Transmission. 
 
█ Riassunto La mentalizzazione implicita ed esplicita e la sua relazione con l’introspezione – In questo arti-
colo discuterò alcune tesi formulate da Marraffa nel suo Mindreading and Introspection. Studi precedenti 
hanno affermato che la mentalizzazione (o Teoria della Mente – TdM) dovrebbe essere osservata ini-
zialmente durante gli anni precedenti la scolarizzazione. Ricerche successive hanno sottolineato che la 
TdM sembra essere già presente negli infanti. Cercherò di sostenere che l’apparente incongruenza tra 
questi risultati può essere ricomposta distinguendo tra una TdM implicita e una TdM esplicita. Da una 
prospettiva evoluzionistica la funzione dei due sistemi TdM sembra essere differente. Il primo è un mec-
canismo neuro cognitivo ereditario che permette di avere precise attese sul comportamento. Il secondo è 
un’abilità ereditata culturalmente, che ha bisogno di modellare più complesse interazioni sociali. Cercherò 
quindi di discutere il rapporto tra la mentalizzazione implicita ed esplicita e l’introspezione. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Teoria della mente; Mentalizzazione implicita; Mentalizzazione esplicita; Introspezione; 
Trasmissione culturale. 
 
 
 
█  Introduction 
 
 OUR ABILITY TO ASCRIBE MENTAL states 
to ourselves and others is known as “mental-
izing”, “theory of mind”, “folk psychology” or 
“mind reading.” It has been a major focus of 
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philosophical investigation for centuries and 
of scientific enquiry for over 30 years. 
The lack of consensus on how to charac-
terize this human capacity to reason about 
mental states (such as belief) has been high-
lighted by recent research. Children under 3 
or 4 years of age fail critical tests of belief 
reasoning (explicit ToM), yet infants appar-
ently pass implicit false belief tasks at 13 or 
15 months and infants as young as 7 months 
seem to be capable of mind reading. Non-
human animals also fail critical tests of belief 
reasoning but may demonstrate very com-
plex social behaviours.1 Studies indicating 
that infants are capable of mindreading ap-
parently support the view that mind reading 
depends on genetically evolved mechanisms 
since there is very little opportunity for cul-
tural inheritance in the first months of life. 
However, other research suggests that, 
although infants seem to be mind reading, 
they are not using the same mechanisms that 
control “full-blown” or “explicit” mind read-
ing in adults – mechanisms that allow us to 
deliberate and talk about mental states.2  
Research on infants, which infer evidence 
for mind reading from nonverbal behavior 
such as looking time and anticipatory look-
ing, are said to provide evidence for “implic-
it” mentalization. Implicit mentalization can 
be interpreted in TWO ways: the continuity 
interpretation (One-ToM system) or the 
Two-ToM systems hypothesis. 
(1) The continuity interpretation (One 
ToM system) suggests that implicit mentali-
zation is controlled by the same neurocogni-
tive mechanisms that mediate explicit mind 
reading in adults.3 Scholars of the One-ToM 
Hypothesis (One-ToM) propose that human 
beings operate with one and only one men-
talizing system – which is understood as a 
cognitive architecture of a particular design 
and a dedicated, domain-specific function. 
Carruthers has advanced the most developed 
contemporary version of the One-ToM hy-
pothesis, which holds that one, and only one, 
mind reading system operates throughout 
the whole of human development – from ear-
ly infancy to adulthood. Crucially, as Car-
ruthers emphasises, «while the operations of 
this system probably become more stream-
lined and efficient with age, its representa-
tional capacities do not alter in any funda-
mental way».4 
(2) The Two-ToM systems interpretation 
suggests that implicit and explicit mind read-
ing arise from different neurocognitive me-
chanisms; both systems are domain specific, 
specialized for thinking about mental states.5 
The Two-ToM hypothesis proposes that 
humans, at least, may be operating not with 
one, but with two functionally distinct min-
dreading systems. One of the main motiva-
tions behind this hypothesis is apparently the 
fact that mastery of propositional attitude 
concepts and their attribution require a great 
deal of cognitive sophistication. Two-ToMH 
postulates that in normally developing hu-
man adults implicit minimal ToM and ex-
plicit full ToM continue to exist intact and 
operate alongside one another.  
The Two-ToM hypothesis has adequate 
means to deal with the developmental “para-
dox”. On the assumption that implicit mini-
mal ToM comes into play early on, it is hy-
pothesized that human infants use this sys-
tem, and only this one, when attributing 
mental states in cases of basic social cogni-
tion. Another mentalizing capacity comes into 
play only after older children begin to pass ex-
plicit, verbally based false belief tests – a first 
sign of the emergence of full explicit ToM. 
Another reason to believe in the Two-
ToM hypothesis, stems from the need to ex-
plain a range of evidence about human adult 
performance which suggests that ToM re-
sponding is sometimes fast and automatic 
and at other times slow and effortful. More-
over, it seems that the operation of explicit 
Full ToM abilities in adult humans is some-
times affected by a more automatic tendency 
to engage in basic ToM tasks in certain ex-
perimental set ups.  
The Two-ToM hypothesis also has the 
advantage of being able to explain why im-
plicit basic ToM abilities are widespread, oc-
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curring not only in human adults under cog-
nitive load but also in infants and in other 
non-human animals, whereas explicit full 
ToM cognition is comparatively rare. 
According to the two ToM hypothesis, 
the implicit system develops early and tracks 
mental states in a fast and efficient way, 
whereas the explicit system develops later, 
operates more slowly, and makes heavier 
demands on executive functions, such as 
working memory and inhibitory control. Ev-
idence for dissociation between implicit and 
explicit mind reading is found in studies of 
neurotypical adults.  
In tasks in which adults make verbal 
judgments about others people’s thoughts 
and feelings (explicit mind reading), judg-
ment accuracy is impaired by concurrent per-
formance of an executive function task. In-
stead, concurrent demands on executive 
function do not interfere with implicit mind 
reading. Further evidence for this dissocia-
tion is found in studies with autistic individ-
uals, in which explicit mind reading can be 
achieved, in spite of continuing problems 
with implicit mind reading. 
These dissociations are hard to reconcile 
with the continuity hypothesis (One ToM) 
but are compatible with the Two-ToM-
systems interpretation. According to the 
Two-ToM systems account, moreover, ex-
plicit mind reading, which allows us to delib-
erate about mental states and to express our 
thoughts about mental states in words, de-
velops slowly and is cognitively demanding. 
Indeed, specialization of mentalization con-
tinues into late adolescence and the perfor-
mance on explicit tests of mind reading (in-
cluding perspective taking, emotion recogni-
tion, and detection of pretense and irony) 
continues to improve between adolescence 
and adulthood. 
In an evolutionary perspective, the func-
tion of the Two-ToM systems seems to be 
different. The first one is an expression of a 
basic motivation for social interaction: the 
infant is equipped with a genetically inherited 
neurocognitive mechanism that yields accu-
rate expectations about behavior. The se-
cond one is a culturally inherited skill, needed 
to modulate more complex social interac-
tions and for the transmission of culture. 
 
█  Explicit mentalization 
 
Evidence that the development of explicit 
mind reading depends on a slow process of 
learning, rather than on the maturation of 
genetically inherited neurocognitive mecha-
nisms, comes from a twin study.6 When more 
than one thousand twin pairs were given a 
comprehensive battery of explicit mind-
reading tests at 5 years of age, the correlation 
in performance within pairs was the same for 
non-identical twins and for identical twins. 
This indicates a “substantial shared envi-
ronmental influence but negligible genetic 
influence on individual differences in theory 
of mind”. However, by itself, this twin study 
does not tell us about the nature of the envi-
ronmental influence or about the kind of 
learning involved in the development of ex-
plicit mind reading. 
Studies of social influences on the devel-
opment of children’s ToM ability can help us 
better understand the development of men-
talizing, in the third-person and in the first-
person, and the construction of the self rep-
resentation. In the last decades, substantial 
research has contributed to a better under-
standing of social influences on the develop-
ment of (explicit) ToM. Since the landmark 
study of Dunn and colleagues on the rela-
tionship of family environment to children’s 
ToM ability, there has been increasing evi-
dence suggesting that specific features of the 
early social environment are associated with 
precocity in children’s understanding of 
mind. Dunn and colleagues reported a rela-
tionship between certain types of family in-
teraction (such as the tendency to discuss 
feelings and use causal state language) and 
children’s subsequent (explicit) ToM per-
formance.  
Subsequently, Perner and Ruffman re-
ported that the mere presence of (older) sib-
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lings had a facilitatory effect on (explicit) 
ToM performance. Indeed contact with old-
er children and adults, beyond the nuclear 
family, appears to have a similar effect in aid-
ing children’s understanding of mind.7 
Now it is important to deepen the rela-
tionship between research on social influ-
ences on (explicit) ToM and general theories 
about the development of ToM. There are 
two well-established accounts of mind read-
ing: simulation theory and theory-theory.8 
Although they were previously treated as 
competing approaches to the explanation of 
mind reading, it is now widely accepted that 
these are complementary accounts, with theo-
ry-theory having a greater role in explicit high-
level mind reading, whereas simulation theory 
is more relevant to implicit low-level mind 
reading.  
This complementarity emerges also from 
neuroimaging studies: F. Van Overwalle, in a 
meta-analysis based on over 200 fMRI stud-
ies, founded that several brain areas process 
information relevant for social cognition, the 
capacity to understand people’s behavioral 
intentions, beliefs, and personality traits.9 
The results suggest that inferring temporary 
states such as goals, intentions, and desires of 
other people – even when they are false and 
unjust from our own perspective – strongly 
engages the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). 
Inferring more enduring dispositions of oth-
ers and the self, or interpersonal norms and 
scripts, engages the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC), although temporary states can also 
activate the mPFC.  
Thus, the available evidence is consistent 
with the role of a TPJ-related mirror system 
for inferring temporary goals and intentions 
at a relatively perceptual level of representa-
tion, as described by the simulation model, 
and the role of the mPFC in a system that in-
tegrates social information across time and 
allows reflection and representation of traits 
and norms, and presumably also of inten-
tionality, at a more abstract cognitive level, in 
accordance with the theory-theory account.  
I think that the development of explicit 
ToM, in addition to the contributions of the 
theory-theory and simulation accounts, may 
be better understood according to a socio-
constructivist model.  
In a cultural evolutionary framework, the 
socio-constructivist view suggests that the 
novice’s ideas about the mind are derived 
primarily not from simulation or from obser-
vation and hypothesis testing (according to 
theory theory) but from instruction, from 
what the novice is told about the mind by the 
expert mind readers in her social world. The 
social constructivist hypothesis is based on 
various findings, of which the most interesting 
are the development of ToM in deaf children 
and studies on cultural variations of ToM.10 
Deaf children of hearing parents take 12 
to 15 years to proceed through the same 
steps in the development of ToM that take 
hearing children 4 or 5 years. In contrast, 
deaf children of deaf parents, who learn sign 
language as their native language, do not 
show these delays. The deaf-of-hearing chil-
dren have much less conversational experi-
ence than hearing or deaf-of-deaf children and 
this probably leads to the very delayed ap-
pearance of each developmental step, even 
though the sequence of these steps is the same. 
In combination with other research in-
volving typically and atypically developing 
children, research on deaf individuals and 
cross cultural studies indicates that we learn 
about the mind through both early socio-
pragmatic interactions and through conver-
sations about the mind. The appropriate 
conversational experience could come at first 
by listening to what expert mind readers say 
when they have no intention of teaching a 
novice. However, many studies suggest that 
experts, especially mothers, tailor or “epis-
temically engineer” their conversations about 
the mind so that it helps children to learn. 
There are many data on the relationship 
between mindreading and language11 but we 
should always remember that ToM devel-
opment begins in infancy, before language 
development, as children begin to pay atten-
tion to other’s minds following their eye-
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gaze, engaging in joint attention and under-
standing other’s goals and intentions. In 
summary, children culturally inherit from 
their parents, and other mindreading experts, 
such as siblings, the mechanisms specialized 
for the representation of mental states. 
Debate currently surrounds whether min-
dreading is based on the preordained matu-
rational unfolding of a neurobiological min-
dreading module or on the uniquely human 
early socio-pragmatic interactions and con-
versational experiences that all societies pro-
vide for their young to nurture children’s de-
veloping understanding.  
In contrast with nativist theories of mind-
reading (useful for understanding implicit 
ToM), the social constructivist, cultural evo-
lutionary hypothesis suggests that humans do 
not genetically inherit neurocognitive mech-
anisms specialized for the development of 
explicit mind reading. Nonetheless, the ge-
netically evolved mechanisms of implicit 
ToM provide much of the raw material, the 
genetic “start-up kit” for the construction of 
explicit mind reading: the mechanisms that 
become specialized for the representation of 
mental states and the processes that make 
cultural inheritance possible. 
Implicit mindreading emerges from ob-
serving the behavior of others (and the con-
text in which it takes place). This is a one-
way process. The learner observes the actor, 
who need not be aware that he or she is being 
observed. In contrast, in a socio-constructi-
vist, cultural evolutionary account, explicit 
mind reading emerges from the instructive 
behavior of others. This is essentially a two-
way process. The behavior of the actor is de-
signed to help the observer learn, and both 
actor and observer are actively engaged in a 
communicative process.  
Components of a start-up kit for such 
processes might include the preference of 
newborn infants for faces, biological motion, 
eye contact and the preference of very young 
infants for objects that respond to their own 
actions with high contingency.  
Explicit mindreading is culturally inherit-
ed: the neurocognitive mechanisms that al-
low us to deliberate and talk about mental 
states are probably constructed, or recycled, 
from mechanisms that evolved genetically to 
fulfill more general functions (e.g. to parse 
and predict dynamic sequences of events and 
to get information from others), and the con-
struction process depends on tuition. Expert 
mind readers communicate mental-state 
concepts, and ways of representing these 
concepts, to novices. As the present genera-
tion of novices becomes expert, it passes on 
the knowledge and skill of mind reading to 
the next cultural generation. 
From a Vygotskyian perspective most, 
possibly all, human neurocognitive skills are 
shaped by culture, and many are culturally 
inherited. Mindreading, implicit and explicit, 
is an essential aspect of human social intelli-
gence; it evolved to provide an adaptive ad-
vantage in pursuing the aims of two main mo-
tivational systems: self-assertiveness / compe-
tition and cooperation. It is plausible to pos-
tulate a very strict link between the evolution 
of specifically human forms of explicit men-
talization and the emergence of social sys-
tems that call for high cooperation.12 
In infancy, when the enculturation pro-
cess is just beginning, implicit mindreading 
mechanisms produce, under some circum-
stances, accurate expectations about the be-
havior of agents. Implicit mindreading me-
chanisms continue to operate throughout the 
life cycle, enabling swift social coordination 
of behavior when time is short and other de-
mands on the neurocognitive system are 
heavy. It is possible that the outputs of these 
implicit mechanisms also contribute to the 
development of explicit mind reading by, for 
example, segmenting the stream of observa-
ble behavior into units that can subsequently 
be aligned with mental categories. 
However implicit mindreading is radically 
insufficient for the development of explicit 
mind reading. Research suggests that no 
amount of individual learning – implicit mind 
reading, simulation, introspection, and watch-
ing the behavior of others – would be enough 
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for the development of explicit mind reading. 
 
█  Introspection 
 
These considerations are also relevant to 
the debate on the development of introspec-
tion discussed in Marraffa’s article.13 Many 
philosophers and psychologists, such as Aris-
totele, Agostino, Descartes, Locke, have tra-
ditionally assumed that self knowledge has a 
peculiar feature, that knowledge of our own 
thoughts (intentions, desires, opinions, be-
liefs) is direct and reliable.  
Even today many philosophers argue that 
knowledge of at least a subset of our own 
thoughts, is based on direct access. This view 
is also widespread among cognitive scientists, 
in particular among those who believe that 
third-person mentalization is grounded in 
first-person mentalization. Other authors ar-
gue that self-knowledge comes from the act 
of turning on oneself the capacity to min-
dread other people. Let us consider, for ex-
ample, Carruther’s theory of introspection 
whih is center stage in Marraffa’s paper.  
In Carruthers’ account, mentalization is 
one of the concept-using consumer systems 
in the global workspace models of human 
neurocognitive architecture proposed by 
Baars. Carruthers thinks that self knowledge 
is based on the observation of our own be-
havior and the context in which it takes 
place, and on the perception of our own emo-
tional primary events (affects), other forms 
of sensory experience, visual images and in-
ner monologue. Carruthers’ theory is called 
“interpretive sensory-access” (ISA), a sophis-
ticated version of the self/other parity ac-
count. Carruthers explains self-knowledge by 
direct sensory access and interpretation of 
own thoughts. 
As Marraffa points out, there is a large 
amount of data supporting the ISA theory: in 
particular interpretations of the research on 
confabulation, cognitive dissonance and self-
attribution in social psychology, data on 
“metacognition”, data on neuroimaging, as 
well as criticism of “two methods” theories 
which predict, but have not confirmed, a dis-
sociation between third-person mentaliza-
tion and first-person mentalization in schiz-
ophrenia and autism. 
In children with autism spectrum disor-
der, the capacity to attribute intentions to 
themselves is just as impaired as the capacity 
to attribute intentions to other people, and 
poor performances in both aspects result 
from the difficulties that such children have 
with mindreading in general. With regard to 
schizophrenia, passivity experiences are not 
best explained by the impairment of a system 
subserving first-person mindreading, but by 
a failure of the so-called “comparator sys-
tem”, one of the main components of the ac-
tion-control system. If we accept the hypoth-
esis that self-knowledge is based on turning 
on oneself the capacity to mindread other 
people, we should ask ourselves, referring to 
the previous discussion, if we are talking 
about implicit or explicit introspection (first-
person mentalization). 
We can assume an implicit system (un-
conscious) of self experience which includes, 
primarily, the basic emotional events (af-
fects) felt by the subject and other forms of 
sensory experiences, basic aspects of motor 
intentionality, in addition to perceptions of 
visual images, and later, with the develop-
ment of language, also interior monologue. 
This implicit form of self experience could be 
discussed in reference to models of early de-
velopment of the self, like those of the inter-
oceptive, “sentient self” of Craig, the ecologi-
cal self of Neisser, the core self of Damasio 
and the minimal self of Gallagher.14 
While the self is a popular topic in both 
cognitive neuroscience and psychology, the 
term is often used to discuss multiple differ-
ent phenomena, and can thus be difficult to 
define.15 Some of the most prominent and 
influential thinkers in psychology have theo-
rized about the self. James wrote in The Prin-
ciples of Psychology that the self is not a single 
primordial entity. This early conceptualiza-
tion set the stage for later work examining 
multiple facets of the self.  
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Neisser claims that people have access to 
five different kinds of information about 
themselves. He describes five kinds of self-
knowledge which may develop during differ-
ent periods: (1) the ecological self, perceived 
with respect to the physical environment; (2) 
the interpersonal self, which depends on 
emotional and other species-specific forms of 
communication; (3) the temporally extended 
self based on memory and anticipation, im-
plying a representation of self; (4) the private 
self, reflecting knowledge that our conscious 
experiences are exclusively our own; and (5) 
the conceptual self, based on sociocultural 
experience. According to this view, the self is 
not some special part of a person or brain, 
but rather a whole person considered from a 
particular point of view. 
Gallagher delineates yet another distinc-
tion which he calls the “minimal self” versus 
the “narrative self”. Here, the “minimal” self is 
referred to as the self devoid of temporal ex-
tension; phenomenologically, a consciousness 
of oneself as an immediate subject of experi-
ence, depending on brain processes and an 
ecologically embedded body. The “narrative” 
self, on the other hand, involves personal iden-
tity and continuity across time; it is a self-
image constituted with a past and future in 
stories that we and others tell about ourselves. 
Jeannerod’s account is also interesting: he 
espouses the view that a key component of 
self-recognition in humans is recognizing one-
self as the owner of a body and the agent of 
actions. These sensations of ownership and 
agency arise from the congruence of proprio-
ceptive feedback and sensory signals from 
body parts, and central signals that contrib-
ute to the generation of movements. He 
claims that the sense of agency provides a 
way for the self to build an identity inde-
pendent of the external world.16 
These raw elements – affective, motor, sen-
sory, and quasi-sensory states such as visual 
imagery or inner speech tokens – along with 
descriptions of themselves that children re-
ceive in their interactions, primarily with the 
caregiver, and then with “significant others” 
(siblings, peers, other significant adults), 
would constitute the basis for self-knowledge 
and, later, for self-awareness. The reference to 
sensorial data which the subject would access 
directly, according to the ISA model, would 
also show the importance of the fundamental 
representation of a physical, bodily self, to 
which a social self (what we are for and in re-
lation to others), and finally, but only in cer-
tain socio-cultural contexts a psychic self, a 
self representation in the virtual space of the 
mind would be added, gradually, according 
to the William James’ model.  
The hypothesis of a dissociation between 
bodily, social and psychological aspects of self-
consciousness is congruent with data from cul-
tural psychology and ethnopsychiatry, which 
show the predominance of physical and so-
cial rather than psychological self-conscious-
ness in adults belonging to preliterate cul-
tures. The early evidence concerning the pre-
literate subjects’ difficulties in representing a 
psychic self, an inner experiential space, is 
reported in A. Luria.17 
Data from developmental psychology and 
neuroimaging studies are also congruent with 
the hypothesis of a dissociation between bodily, 
social and psychological aspects of self-conscious-
ness. Gillihan and Farah suggest that physical 
or embodied self-related processes and psy-
chological or evaluative self-related processes 
rely on distinct large-scale brain networks.18 
From a Vygotskian perspective, the develop-
ment of (explicit) introspective self-conscious-
ness is an «outward-in construction that oc-
curs in an interpersonal context, namely, in 
the relationship with caregivers and peers».19  
Introspection, understood in this theoret-
ical context, is relevant to the psychodynamic 
topic of defenses, according to the hypothesis 
that our activity of re-appropriation of the 
products of the neurocomputational uncon-
scious is governed by a self-apologetic defen-
siveness.20 For example, in Strangers to Our-
selves T.D. Wilson argues that the self-
transparency assumption could make it easi-
er for subjects to engage in various kind of 
adaptive self-deception, helping them to build 
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and maintain a positive self-image.21 
In Mindreading and Introspection Mar-
raffa argues that subjective identity develops 
through the act of turning on oneself the ca-
pacity to mindread other people through so-
cio-communicative interaction with caregiv-
ers (and later other social partners) investi-
gated by the psychodynamics theory: «The 
young child who turned his mindreading 
abilities upon himself under the thrust of the 
caregiver’s mind-minded talk, by the end of 
pre-school years begins to grasp his intro-
spective self-description as rationalized in 
terms of autobiography».22 
This process of narrative self-construction 
includes a crucial psychodynamic aspect: affec-
tive growth and the construction of identity are 
inextricably linked. Thus, self-consciousness is 
a complex neuro-cognitive and psychosocial 
construction, which develops from the implicit, 
automatic and prereflective processing of rep-
resentations of objects (object-consciousness), 
through awareness and then self-awareness of 
the body, up to explicit introspective self-
awareness and then narrative identity.  
The primary form of self-consciousness is 
bodily self-consciousness, probably structured 
as a nonverbal and analogic own-body repre-
sentation: «[B]ut very soon it begins to be 
mediated by the verbal exchange with the 
caregiver. In other words, in our species the 
chimpanzee-style, purely bodily self-aware-
ness is almost immediately outstripped and 
encompassed by a form of descriptive self-
consciousness that is strictly linked to linguis-
tic tools and social cognition mechanisms».23 
Bodily self-description is the prerequisite 
for autobiographical encoding and storage, 
acting as a fixed referent around which per-
sonally experienced event memories begin to 
be organized.24 This hypothesis has a signifi-
cant impact on the psychopathological un-
derstanding of severe mental disorders, such 
as autism and schizophrenia. 
Humans are pre-wired for interpersonal 
relationships from their birth, and implicit 
mindreading is part of such pre-organization. 
Introspective self-consciousness takes shape 
in the child in relationship with caregivers, in 
a form of scaffolding which initially is not 
linguistic, which is made up of non verbal in-
teractions, turn taking, exchange of commu-
nicative gestures, affect regulation, basic so-
cio-pragmatic communicative competence, 
and not only of words, descriptions, designa-
tions, evaluations of the person.  
Through dialogue (nonverbal and verbal) 
with caregivers, and then with other social 
partners, children construct their own identi-
ty, both objective (for others) and subjective 
(for themselves):25 «The intentional actions 
and attitudes repeatedly expressed towards 
the young child by caregivers and peers serve 
as the inferential basis for attributing gener-
alized intentional properties to the self in an 
attempt to rationalize the social partner’s 
self-directed behaviors».26  
We can thus assume the existence of two 
different mechanisms: one at the base of the 
implicit self experience and one at the base of 
the explicit self representation. In normally de-
veloping human adults implicit self experience 
and explicit self representation continue to 
operate alongside one another, while in severe 
mental disorders we can find several kinds of 
impairments. For example, abnormalities in 
the awareness of action, and consequently im-
pairments of the sense of agency and owner-
ship in schizophrenia, or the impairment of 
psychological self awareness, self reference and 
representation of intentions in autism. 
Explicit mentalization, in the third-person 
(mindreading) and in the first-person (intro-
spection), requires a social constructivist anal-
ysis, as well as a neurocognitive one. This so-
cio-constuctivist perspective on explicit first-
person mentalization, accounts for various re-
search findings. For example, studies by re-
searchers working in the framework of the 
theory of “self-perception”, initiated by Bem, 
and influenced by the theories of Ryle and 
Skinner, and by symbolic interactionism: the 
identity-for-itself can be said to derive from 
the identity-for-others – we see ourselves, and 
define ourselves, essentially internalizing the 
way in which others see and define us. 
 Valeri 
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Self-awareness, self-consciousness, would 
thus be the outcome of a complex process of 
self experience, self monitoring and self rep-
resentation (physical, social and, finally, psy-
chological) to which both implicit and explic-
it components contribute: implicit percep-
tion of bodily sensations, emotions, motor 
intentionality and explicit psychosocial self 
representation in relation to other social a 
gents. The integration between these differ-
ent levels of self representation is the base of 
an sufficiently stable, although constantly 
precarious, “feel existing”.27 
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